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pRISON OVERCROWDING IN NEBRASKA:
fIlE FEASIBILITY OF INTENSIVE
SUPERVISION PROBATION

--
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DennL'l Hoffman
Vincent 1 Webb
This chapter anal}'7.e8 the magnitude and causes of Nebraska's prison overcrowding
problem. Nebraska's response to this problem has been to expand prison capacity and
to implement programs to decrease length of stay. Another policy option - reducing
prison admissions through intensive supervision probation - is examined in this
chapter. Data from Nebraska Parole Board files indicate there is a category of current
prison inmates that are not sufficiently dangerous to require imprisonment. Many of
these nonviolent offenders with marginal criminal histories could be diverted into
intensive probation programs that are more cost·effective than incarceration.

Introduction
Prison populations in the United States are higher than ever before and
growing fast. During the 1978-85 period, state prison populations increased
from 270,025 to 463,378 inmates. Expenditures by state correctional systems
exceeded $8 billion in 1985 (Zedlewski 1987).
At present, inmate populations exceed cell capacities in almost all states.
As of February 1986, forty-six states and U.S. territories either were under
court order or were involved in litigation concerning prison conditions that
could result in court orders (American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
1986). Conditions related to overcrowding are central to a majority of these
suits.
Some state prisons, such as New York's Sing Sing Prison, have been the
sites of overcrowding-related disturbances in the 1980s (Kurlander 1983). In
fact, a frequent argument against overcrowding is that it leads to prison riots.
Nebraska is one of the few lucky states. Even though its prisons are filled
beyond capacity, there have been no court orders or inmate riots yet.
Correctional policymakers in Nebraska still have the opportunity to take a
proactive approach in regulating the prison population before it gets out of
control.
The authors would like to acknowledge the help of Frank Gunter, Chuck Comwel~ Ron Baltee,
Nikki Reisen, Robm Keller, Stacey Oakes, and Tracy Anderson.
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Many strategies for alleviating overcrowding are available to Nebraska
policymakers. The traditional response to prison overcrowding has been the
construction of additional prison capacity (Blumstein 1983). Other strategies
have been devised to regulate the flow of admissions to prison or to contrOl
the length of time served. Strategies for controlling prison admissions
include revising sentencing law and practice (for example, changing
sentencing guidelines), developing alternative sanctions, and using private
prisons. Strategies for regulating time served range from efforts to speed up
the parole process to attempts to improve classification and expand
prerelease programming (Mullen 1987).

Correctional policymakers in Nebraska still have the
opportunity to take a proactive approach in regulating
the prison population before it gets out of control.
This chapter analyzes the feasibility of Intensive Supervision Probation
(ISP) as an alternative sanction. ISP is an intermediate form of punishment
that permits certain offenders to serve their prison sentences in the
community rather than in prison.
The focus is on ISP for two reasons. First, ISP promises to "get as many
people out of prison and off taxpayers' backs as possible" (Conrad 1986,83).
For Nebraska- a state with a limited population base and limited resources
- ISP is a potentially useful austerity measure. Second, dependable information is available on the cost-effectiveness ofISP. As yet, knowledge is sketchy
and incomplete about other alternatives to prison that have been developed
in the 1980s.
This chapter begins with an overview of the Nebraska prison overcrowding situation. Next, Nebraska's short-term prison population is described in
order to determine whether Nebraska has a sufficient number of nonviolent
offenders who could be placed in ISP without jeopardizing public safety.
Following this needs assessment, the cost-effectiveness and political
acceptability of ISP are examined. The chapter concludes with a summary of
the major findings and1 a discussion of policy actions that Nebraska
policymakers might take.

Prison Overcrowding in Nebraska
Nebraska's state prisons face an overcrowding problem. Understanding
the magnitude of the problem, its causes, and the state correctional ~gencies'
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response to the problem is a necessary prelude to charting a course to solve
the problem.

prison Population Increases
Nebraska's prison population has soared since 1979. In November 1979,
there were 1,256 inmates in Nebraska Department of Correctional Services
(DeS) penal facilities (DCS 1986a). By June 30, 1988, the state prison
population had risen to 2,077 (DCS 1988). This represents nearly a doubling
of prison inmates in less than ten years (figure 1).

Figure 1 - Nebraska Prison Population, 1979-89
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Several factors are responsible for the increases in Nebraska's prison
population.
•

Increasing Admissions. From 1980 to 1986 Nebraska experienCed a
39.2 percent increase in the number of persons given prison sentences
of one or more years (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1987). The 974 total
admissions in 1987 represented an all time high for the Nebraska
penal system (Des 1987b).

•

Increasing Probability of Imprisonment. Between 1980 and 1985, the
ratio of prison commitments to reported crimes in Nebraska
increased from 35 to 39 state prison admissions per 1,000 serious
offenses (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1987).

•

Rising Commitments for Drug Offenses, First Degree Sexual Assault,
and Second Degree Forgery. From 19782 to 1987, \4e percentage of
prison commitments for all drug offenses increased from 5.8 percent
to 14.6 percent; the percentage of commitments for first degree sexual
assault increased from 3.0 percent to 9.3 percent; and the percentage
of commitments for second degree forgery increased from 0.8 percent
to 5.5 percent (Des 1987b). Considering the federal government's
recent allocation of nearly $1.5 million to criminal justice agencies in
Nebraska for the enforcement of state and local drug laws (Nebraska
Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 1987),3 com·
mitments for drug offenses can be expected to continue to increase
over the next few years.

•

Increasing Lengths of Stay in Prison. The median4 length of stay in
Nebraska's prisons has steadily increased from 13 months in 1982 to
15 months in 1983, 19 months in 1984, and 20 months in 1985 and
1986 (Des 1986a). 5

•

Declining Parole Rates. Between 1969 and 1983, parole rates (tht
percentage of hearings granted that resulted in paroles) in Nebraska
were never lower than seventy percent. From 1984 to 1986, however,'
the parole rates of 63.98, 58.19, and 63.78 were substantially lower'
than the parole rates in previous years (Nebraska Parole Bow'
1969_86).6

Based on the assumption that criminal justice policy variables such ai'
these will continue to influence prison popUlation levels, DCS is currentIJ
projecting a year-end population of 2,541 inmates by 1989 (DCS 1986a:
Des also acknowledges that the population at the highest risk of imprisol
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ment (males between th~ ages of 18 and 39) is expected to remain stable in
Nebraska through 1990.

prison Overcrowding
Nebraska's prison population is increasing, but are its prisons really overcrowded? Ont way of measuring prison overcrowding is to compare the
rated capacity of an institution to its actual population. Table 1 indicates
that when rated capacity is used as a yardstick, Nebraska's prisons vary in
overcrowdedness. The Nebraska State Penitentiary and the Lincoln Correctional Center are the most crowded DCS facilities. The Nebraska State
Penitentiary is5~,:?_percent over capacity, while the Lincoln Correctional
Center is 44.2 percent over capacity. The Omaha Correctional Center, at
22.1 percent over capacity, and the Nebraska Center for Women, at 10.7
percent over capacity, are much less crowded.

The Nebraska State Penitentiary
has seventy percent of the inmates housed
in less than sixty square feet per cell;
the Lincoln Correctional Center has sixty percent
of the inmates living in less than sixty square feet each . ...
Another way of measuring overcrowding is to examine spatial density.
Most standard-setting bodies, such as the American Correctional Association, require sixty square feet of living space for each inmate, which is
roughly the size of a bathroom in an American home. To figure the percentage of inmates housed in sixty square feet or less in Nebraska's prisons, the
following method was used: (1) DCS data were obtained indicating the
average cell size is seventy-five square feet at the Nebraska State Penitentiary, seventy square feet at the Lincoln Correctional Center, and eightythree square feet at the Omaha Correctional Center (DeS 1987c); (2) it was
assumed that every inmate classified as a bed deficit (that is, being without
his or her own cell) must share a cell with another inmate who is not
classified as a bed deficit; (3) the bed deficit for each facility was multiplied by
two to get the number of inmates sharing a space designed for single
occupancy; and (4) that number was then divided by the total population of a
. facility to get the percentage of inmates living in sixty square feet or less.
This method shows that the Nebraska State Penitentiary has seventy
percent of its inmates housed in less than sixty square feet per cell; the
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Table 1 - Rated Capacities, Current Populations, and Bed Deficits of Nebraska's Prisons
on
February 17,1987

Facility

Rated
Capacity

Actual
Population

Bed
Deficit

Percemover
Capa~

Nebraska State Penitentiary
Inside NSP Facility
Trusty Dormitory

338
150

525
154

187
4

55.3
2.7

Lincoln Correctional Center

468

675

205

44.2

Omaha Correctional Center

240

293

53

22.1

Nebraska Center for Women

84

93

9

10.7

Source: Department of Correctional Services.

Lincoln Correctional Center has sixty percent of its inmates living in less
than sixty square feet each; and the Omaha Correctional Center !1aS thirty.
six percent of its inmates housed in less than sixty square feet each.

Corollaries of Crowding
Nebraska's prison overcrowding-related problems mirror the problems
encountered by most states' prisons. First, the number of prisoners inside
Nebraska's prisons places severe pressure upon the staff, support services,
and financial resources of Des. While the prison population has risen
rapidly, there has not been a concomitant increase in facility staff to manage
inmates (Des 1986a). Generally, resources are becoming insufficient to
meet the basic needs of inmates and the prison system (Des 1986a).
Second, the potential for inmate violence in Nebraska's prisons may be
increasing. The most comprehensive research on the linkage between prison
overcrowding and inmate violence (Gaes and McGuire 1984)10 concluded
that "overcrowding . . . is the best predictor of assault rates," and that
housing large numbers of inmates in dormitories (common areas) is related
to higher levels of assault. At the Nebraska State Penitentiary about 150,
inmates are housed in a dormitory (table 1), thus heightening the chances for
inmate violence there.
Third, overcrowding adversely affects programming. Due to budget.
cutbacks, programming for inmates has been decreased rather than
increased, even though the prison population continues to rise (DeS 1986b).!
Parole board members blame overcrowding for a shortage of opportunities
for inmates to participate in work and rehabilitation programs (Alvarez and!

prisOn Overcrowding in Nebraska
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Wieseman 1987). Des officials blame overcrowding as the cause of increased
idleness and overclassification (for example, placing inmates in higher
security levels than the inmates' behavior and background require) (Tewes

1987).
Fourth, prisoner litigation relating to crowded conditions is mounting,
along with concern among correctional officials about the likelihood of a
court order (Gunter 1987a). According to the Des director, other states
faced with similar overcrowding-related problems have been placed under
court order (Gunter 1987b). Such litigation imposes costs on the state
because these lawsuits require the resources of the state attorney general
office as well as the court system.

Nebraska's Response
Nebraska's response to prison overcrowding has been to expand prison
capacity and to create programs to reduce length of stay in prison.
f\:Prison Expansion. For the most part, Des has been trying to build its
It constructed the Omaha
Correctional Center in 1984 to house 240 medium- and minimum-security
inmates (Des 1984-85). It also converted a vacant building on the Hastings
Regional Center campus into a 160-bed, minimum-security prison in 1987.

Way out of the problem of prison overcrowding.

Des has been trying to build its way
out of the problem ofprison overcrowding.
Future Des plans include building a ISO-bed, minimum-security area
within the compound of the Omaha Correctional Center and constructing a
new ISO-bed, minimum-security unit near the old reformatory in Lincoln
(DCS 1986c). At completion (projected for the summer of 1990), system
capacity is expected to be 1,959 male and female beds. Assuming the DeS
projection of 2,541 inmates in 1990 is accurate, the population would still be
thirty percent over design capacity after construction was finished (Des
19800).

The Price of Prison. The price of prison is high. Construction of the
Omaha Correctional Center cost over $18 million. Of this amount, $500,000
was paid to acquire a site for the facility in Omaha and $1.5 million was
expended to prepare the site for construction (Falconer 1988). The remaining $16 million was used for actual construction costs.
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To cover the costs of future prison expansion for 1987-90, Des mad
special request to the Nebraska Legislature in December 1986 for nearly $
million in additional funding to accommodate estimated prison overpop
lation through 1990 (Des 1986a). Included in this Des proposal were fun
for the construction and operation of three new penal facilities. Ini
construction was estimated to cost $562,700 for the Hastings RegiO
Center, $1,401,800 for the new unit at the Omaha Correctional Center, a
$1,973,790 for the new unit at the Lincoln Correctional Center (D
1986a).11 Extra funds were also included to meet the costs resulting fr
underestimated and unbudgeted increases in the prison population ea
year.
Building prisons is only part of the cost. Additional costs are paid ev
year through the operating budget - what it costs to run the priso
Estimated future annual operating costs are $1,088,781 for the Hastin
Regional Center, $755,429 for the new addition at the Omaha Correctio
Center, and $1,120,080 for the addition at the Lincoln Correctional Cen
(DCS 1986a).
Current annual operating costs, including indirect costs such as D
admini.,trative expenses and per capita costs for Nebraska's prisons,
shown in table 2. A useful way of looking at this expenditure data is to th
of the costs of an individual sentence. As table 2 indicates, one year of act
time served at the Nebraska State Penitentiary represents a commitmen
$17,045 of the taxpayers' money. In effect, a sentence of one year or
years says that offender and that crime are worth resources totaling $17,0
or $170,450.

Table 2 - Annual Operating and Per Capita Costs for Nebraska's Prisons, FY 1986-87'

Facility

Annual
Operating Cost

Per Capita
Cost

Nebraska State Penitentiary

$11,587,349

$17,045

Lincoln Correctional Center
and Evaluation Unit

$9,891,289

$14,803

Omaha Correctional Center

$4,088,710

$13,983

Nebraska Center For Women

$1,847,231

$21,331

'Table includes neither the costs of the community corrections centers in Omaha and Linc
nor the costs of the Hastings Regional Center.
Source: Department of Correctional Services.
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Besides operating costs, there are also incalculable - but real- opportunity costs associated with prison expansion. These should be considered as
lost opportunity costs, because funds devoted to prisons are unavailable for
other public purposes, such as education, health, and economic development.
Return on Investment. What do Nebraskans receive for these large outlays of money? Possible benefits of incarceration include:
• Incapacitation, or the prevention of crimes because the offender is in
prison;
• Specific deterrence, or the prevention of crimes because punishment
dissuades the punished from repeating crimes;
• Reduced recidivism because inmates are rehabilitated; and
• General deterrence, or prevention of crimes by would-be offenders
who are deterred because offenders are punished (Funke 1985).
The few studies that have priced the benefits of incapacitation and
reduced recidivism indicate that prisons do not provide enough of these
kinds of benefits to justify them by cost alone (Funke 1985). One study, for
example, examined the incapacitation benefits of a typical federal correctional institution and concluded that the monetary value of avoided crimes
was less than the costs of incarceration (McGuire 1978).

The few studies that have priced the benefits
of incapacitation and reduced recidivism
indicate that prisons do not provide
enough of these kinds of benefits to
justify them by cost alone.
Despite the many public discussions and political debates that have
concluded with certainty that prisons deter crime and therefore sentences
ought to be longer, there is little evidence to support the notion that
deterrence is a major benefit of prison. A review of more than twenty
analyses directed at testing whether or not the use of noncapital sanctions
deters crime cautioned that the evidence "is still not sufficient for providing a
rigorous confirmation of the existence of a deterrent effect." (Nagin 1978)
Regarding the incapacitation effects of prison, a distinction must be
drawn between schemes iIlvolving collective incapacitation and those using
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selective incapacitation. Under collective incapacitation, standardized
sentences would be developed on the basis of data on rates of recidivism
associated with various crimes. Under selective incapacitation, individualized
sentences would be given based on predictions about the likelihood that
specific offenders would commit serious offenses at a high rate if not locked
up. A leading expert on the usefulness of incapacitating criminals reviewed
the research findings on incapacitation and concluded that:
Collective incapacitation policies have only modest impacts on crime but can cause
enormous increases in prison populations. Selective incapacitation strategies offer the
possibility of achieving greater reductions in crime at considerably smaller costs in
prison resources, but their success depends critically on the ability to identify high- rate
offenders early in their careers or prospectively. As yet, this has not been accomplished
(Cohen 1983,5).

Regarding rehabilitation as a benefit of prison, study after study has
shown that rehabilitative programs have promised much but delivered very
little in terms of transforming criminals into law-abiding citizens (Bailey
1966; Morris 1974; Lerman 1975; Lipton and others 1975; Riedel and
Thornberry 1978). Even if rehabilitation were a proven benefit of prison
this alone would be a weak justification for incarceration, because the prime
objective of prisons in the United States is control, not changing the
lawbreaker.
More powerful rationales for prisons stem from noneconomic premises
that have little to do with either money or recidivism. It is almost certain tha
there are crimes that can not be priced, such as murder, rape and robbery;
and prison can playa useful role in assuring that persons who commit these
types of crimes are punished. Also, most people would agree that some
offenders are so dangerous they must be locked up, and prison can play an
important role in incapacitating these offenders. Additionally, there are
persistent criminals who do not respond to probation, parole, or other forms
of community corrections, and prison can provide the restrictive controls
that these offenders require (Conrad 1985).
If imprisonment in Nebraska were limited to violent, dangerous, and
repeat offenders, the state would not have a prison overcrowding problem
But, as the present study will show, there are many nonviolent offenders who
are serving time for property crimes in Nebraska's prisons. Some of these
offenders could be out of prison under supervision, working and paying
taxes, rather than occupying expensive prison cells.

Alternatives to Prison. Reversing the trend toward ever more prisons aq
prisoners will require a coordinated effort by Nebraska's criminal justiqj
agencies. DeS and the Nebraska Parole Board have begun to chart a coUl'Slj
that may keep the state from making a headlong rush into a costly future!

prison Overcrowding in Nebraska
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They are joiIWy sponsoring two innovative programs: extended leave and
hOuse parole.
Extended Leave. Extended leave allows selected inmates at community
corrections centers who have been set for a parole release date to live at
home, with their families, for a limited tiIneprior to their scheduled parole
releases or discharges from their sentences. Only those inmates who have
successfully participated in a work or educational release program, who have
a stable residence in the community, and who do not pose a danger to the
community, are eligible to apply for extended leave (Des 1986b).
While inmates are in the community on extended leave, they are under
the intensive supervision of Adult Parole Administration field officers (Des
1986b). Inmates must remain at their homes at all tiInes except while at
work, school, or other approved activities. Each inmate has one face-to-face
contact per week, either at horne or on the job, with a parole officer; two
employment contacts per week with a parole officer; and two telephone
contacts per week at horne with a Community Corrections Center staff
person (Des 1986b).

If imprisonment in Nebraska were limited to violent,
dangerous, and repeat offenders, the state would not have
a prison overcrowding problem. But there are many
nonviolent offenders who are serving time for
property crimes in Nebraska's prisons.
Supervising an offender on extended leave costs about the same as
supervising a parolee (about $2,133 in 1986-87), and it is cheaper than housing an inmate at the Community Corrections Centers ($7,871 in 1985-86)
(Cornwell 1988). Another benefit is that inmates on extended leave have
many resources available (for example, mental health and substance abuse
counseling, family and marital counseling, educational and vocational training, and so forth) that may not be available in prison due to overcrowding
(DCS 1986b).
One hundred two inmates participated in the extended leave program
from December 1986 through January 1988. As of February 1, 1988, fortythree of these prisoners had been placed on parole, two had been discharged,
three had been removed for technical violations, and the rest (fifty-four)
were still on extended leave (Cornwell 1988).
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House Parole. House parole is Nebraska's other early release progratn.
House parole is a method of releasing into the community all prisoners who
are near the end of their sentences and who have been paroled but do not
have employment. The main purpose of house parole is to provide offenders
with direct access to employment opportunities.
House parole was begun in January 1986 to remedy a "catch-22" problem
(Cornwell 1988): The Nebraska Parole Board refused to parole inmates into
the community unless they had jobs, yet many inmates found it difficult to
line up jobs while still in prison. As a result, there was a logjam in the parole
process, with many parole-eligible inmates remaining in prison because their
paroles were pending or they were awaiting employment.
Many inmates with approved residences are placed on house parole in
order to find jobs. Parolees on house parole must seek a job from 8:00 am.
until 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. They must be at their approved
residences from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., Monday through Friday, and aU
weekend (Nebraska Adult Parole Administration 1986). House parolees
who find jobs are placed on regular parole status, while those who fail to find
jobs after 30 days may be returned to prison.
Parolees on house parole are under the supervision of parole officers.
Each parolee must submit a daily list of the places that will be contacted for
employment. The parole officer uses the list to make random checks with
prospective employers to ensure that the parolees are where they are
supposed to be (Nebraska Adult Parole Administration 1986).
The success of house parole could be measured in tenns of how many
offenders find jobs, how many offenders commit crimes while in the
community, and how much cheaper house parole is than prison. So far, no
inmates placed on house parole have committed serious crimes while in the
community (Cornwell 1988). It is impossible, however, to make any other
statements about the success or failure of house parole because neither the
Parole Board nor the Adult Parole Administration keeps statistics on wha
happens to inmates assigned to the program.

Nebraska's Short-Term Prison Population
Building upon the idea that prison overcrowding can be reduced 1»
offering safe and economical alternatives to incarceration, this section gives
a description of the short-term prison population in Nebraska. It addresses
the question of whether there is a sufficient number of nonviolent offenders
in Nebraska's prisons to justify creating ISP programs in Nebraska. Case ftle
of the Nebraska Parole Board were used to obtain data on the short-tern
prison population.

prison Overcrowding in Nebraska
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Identifying the Most Likely Candidates for ISP
The focus is on those prisoners who have minimum terms of two years or
less, because it is assumed that those with shorter sentences have committed
lesS serious crimes and are better risks for release into the community on
ISP. There were 688 men and 86 women sentenced to two years or less in
Nebraska's prisons from January 1, 1987 through January 1, 1988 (Nebraska
Parole Board 1987).
Certain categories of offenders were excluded from consideration as
candidates for ISP because of factors in their criminal histories. Offenders
admitted to prison in 1987 because of parole violations were excluded
because it was doubtful that these offenders would be placed in community
alternatives. Offenders who had served prior prison sentences, who had one
or more prior felony convictions, or whose current offense was a violent
crime, such as murder, sexual assault, or robbery, were excluded for the same
reason. Using these exclusionary criteria, there was a remainder of 281 nonviolent offenders with zero prior felony convictions, hereafter referred to as
NVOZs.
NVOZs do not have to go to prison in Nebraska. All NVOZs are eligible
for probation. In theory, it should be easy for many of them to exit the route
to prison. Nevertheless, Nebraska's judges sent 281 NVOZs to prison in
1987.

Demographic and Social Characteristics of NVOZs
Table 3 gives social and demographic information on NVOZs sentenced
to minimum prison terms of two years or less. Three-fourths were between
17 and 30 years old. About eighty percent of the NVOZs were unmarried,
yet over forty percent had children. Approximately three-fourths of the
offenders had completed some high school. At the time of the current
offense, about one-third of the NVOZs had jobs.
Over seventy percent of the NVOZs had past involvement in drug use
and over eighty percent had used alcohol Data on past successes and failures

NVOZs do not have to go to prison in Nebraska.
All NVOZs are eligible for probation and, in theory,
it should be easy for many of them to exit the route
to prison. Nevertheless, Nebraska'sjudges
sent 281 NVOZs to prison in 1987.
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Table 3 - Social and Demographic Characteristics of Nebraska's NVOb, 1987
Characteristic
Sex
Male
Female

Number·

235

-

Percent· -

46

83.6
16.4

219
62

77.9
22.1

90

Race
White
Minority
Age
17-21
22-30
31-40
41+

129
40
22

32.0
45.9
14.3
7.8

Marital status
Married
Single
Divorced/separated or widowed

53
173
54

18.9
61.6
19.2

Have children
Yes
No

122
159

43.4
56.6

Education
Grade school
Some high school
High school or GED
Some college

16
108
101
55

5.7
38.4
35.9
19.6

Employed at time of arrest
Yes
No

98
182

34.9
64.8

207
74

73.7
26.3

242
39

86.1
13.9

48

17.0
82.6

Known drug use
Yes
No

Known alcohol use
Yes
No

Known mental health history
Yes
No

232

·Total numbers and percentages may vary among subcategories due to incomplete files.
Source: Nebraska Parole Board.
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in drug and alcohol programs and on the drug dependence of individual

offenders were not collected. Therefore, the meaning and policy implications
of data on drug and alcohol use are unclear.

current Offenses of NVOZs
Table 4 presents the offenses for which NVOZ<; were sentenced to
prison. Over half of the offenses committed by NVOZ<; were within the
general categories of property and burglary, and over one-fourth of the
offenses were in the general category of drugs. Burglary, theft, second-degree
forgery, and possession of a controlled substance were the crimes with the
highest percentages of NVOZ<;.
Table 4 - Types and Descriptions of Current Offenses of Nebraska's NVOZs, 1987
Number

Percent

Property
Theft
Second degree forgery
Receiving stolen property
Petty larceny
First degree forgery
Bad check $300-$999
Criminal trespassing
Second degree arson
possession of a forged instrument $300 +
Bad check $1,000 +
Unlawful sale of mortgaged property
Shoplifting third offense
Third degree arson
Bad check $75-$299
Writing a check on nonexistent account

49
28
10
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1

17.4
10.0
3.6
1.4

Drugs
Possession of a controlled substance
Delivery of a dangerous substance
Dealing drugs
Manufacturing a controlled substance
Possession of over one pound of marijuana

24
20
17
4
3

8.5
7.1
6.0
1.4

Burglary

62

22.1

1.1
1.1

1.1
.7
.7
.7
.7
.7
.4
.4
.4

1.1

-continued
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Table 4 continued - Types and Descriptions of Current Offenses ofNebraska's NVOZs, 1987
Number
Other
Driving under a suspended license
Escape
Accessory to a felony
Aiding in a felony
Resisting arrest
Conspiracy
Criminal mischief
Criminal nonsupport
Obstructing police
Operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest
False reporting
Failure to appear
Possession of a concealed weapon
Driving while intoxicated third offense
Abandoning a dead body
Unauthorized operation of a propelled vehicle
Possessing a short shotgun
Criminal attempt
Total

Percent

9
6
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3.2
2.1
1.1
1.1
.7
.7
.7
.4

281

100.0

.4
.4
.4
.4

.4
.4

.4
.4
.4
.4

Source: Nebraska Parole Board.

Legal Processing and Sentencing Information on NVOZs
Legal processing and sentencing information on Nebraska's NVOb is
shown in table 5. More than three-fourths of the NVOZs were committed to
prison for only one count. Nearly seventy percent had minimum sentences of
less than twelve months, while over sixty percent had maximum terms of
twenty-four months or less. Also, almost twenty percent of the NVOZs were
discharged from prison in the same year that they were sentenced to go
there. (It is easy to understand why Nebraska penal authorities refer to
NVOZs as "quick dippers.")
Table 5 also indicates that over forty percent of the NVOZs were
sentenced from Douglas and Lancaster counties. These figures suggest that
there are sufficient numbers of NVOZs in Nebraska's metropolitan areas to
justify the creation of ISP programs in Omaha and Lincoln.

I
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Table 5 - Legal Processing and Sentencing Information of Nebraska's NVOZs, 1987

---

--

Number

Percent

219
54
6
1
1

77.9
19.2
2.1
.4
.4

Minimum sentence
12 months or under
13-18 months
19-24 months

193
34
54

68.3
12.1
19.2

Maximum sentence
24 months and under
25-48 months
49-60 months
61-120 months

172
84
24
1

61.2
29.9
8.5
.4

54
227

19.2
SO.8

93
32
156

33.1
11.4
55.5

Number of counts on current conviction
1

2
3
4

7

Discharged in 1987

Yes

No
Number of NVOZs sentenced to prison from
Douglas, Lancaster, and all other counties
Douglas
Lancaster
All other counties

Source: Nebraska Parole Board.

Criminal Histories of NVOZs
Table 6 gives information on the criminal histories of NVOZs. Overall, it
appears that NVOZs have limited criminal histories. The following facts
stand out:

1. Nearly one-half of the NVOZs had never been previously arrested for
a felony and over ninety percent had three or fewer felony arrests.
2. More than seventy percent had no prior arrests for violent crimes.
3. Although sixty percent of the NVOZs had served time in jail, most of
these jail terms were for traffic violations.
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Table 6 - Criminal Histories of Nebraska's NVOb, 1987

Percent'

138
56
40
24
7
4
2
4

49.1
19.9
14.2
8.5
2.5
1.4
.7
1.4
1.1
.4
.4
.4

Number of prior felony arrests

o
1

2
3
4

5
6

7
8
13
15
32

---

Number'

3
1
1
1

Number of prior (felony and misdemeanor)
arrests for violent crimes

o

199

1
2
3
4

41
25
9

5
8

70.8
14.6
8.9
3.2

3
3
1

1.1
1.1

111
57
38
23
9
8
8
6
21

39.5
20.3
13.5
8.2
3.2
2.8
2.8
2.1
8.3

149
87
29
12
1
2
1

53.0
31.0
10.3
4.3
.4
.7
.4

.4

Number of prior adult jail terms for crimes
and traffic infractions§

o

1
2
3
4

5
6

7
8+
Number of prior adult probation orders

o
1
2

3
5
6

7+

-continued
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Table 6 continued - Criminal Histories ofNebraska's NVOZs, 1987

--

Number·

Percent·

219

77.9
17.8

prior community ~anctions (for ~mple~ fines and
restitution) for cnmes and traffic mfractJons
yes
No

50

probation at time of offense
yes
No

255

Charges pending at time of arrest
Yes
No

230

Warrants or detainers at time of arrest
Yes
No

229

26

47

28

9.3
90.7

16.7
81.9

10.0
81.5

Number of prior juvenile commitments

o

221

1
2

34

22

3

2

4

1

78.6
12.1
7.8
.7
.4

'Total numbers and percentages may vary due to incomplete files.
\ Some NVOZs had multiple jail terms for traffic violations such as failing to have a driver's
license, improperly displaying license plates, lacking proof of automobile ownership, running a
stop sign, failing to yield, having no headlight, driving on the left side of the road, and driving
while intoxicated.
Source: Nebraska Parole Board.

4. Over one-half of the NVOZs had never even been on adult probation, and ninety percent of them were not on probation at the time of
arrest.
5. Approximately eighty percent of the offenders had no prior commitments to juvenile correctional institutions.
6. Over eighty percent of the offenders had no pending charges,
warrants, or detainers at the time of arrest.
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7. Most of the NVOZs (77.9 percent) had prior community sancti
against them, but many of the fines that were included in this catego
were for traffic violations.
0

---

Because of the high cost of imprisonment
and its minimal benefits for NVOZs,
Nebraska taxpayers may be the ones who suffer
when offenders are sentenced to a "quick dip" in prison.

-------------------------------------------------------

From the information on the criminal histories of NVOZs, it is apparen
that many of them could be candidates for ISP. Only a few of the NVOl
(such as the offenders with numerous prior felony arrests in table 6) wOu
not qualify for ISP. Even after excluding the exceptional cases, there woul
still be a large pool of NVOZs eligible for alternatives to prison.

Benefits and Costs of Short Prison Terms for NVOZs

Most of the NVOZs sentenced to prison in Nebraska are sentenced fo
retribution or punishment, protection, and deterrence. However, priso
sentences for NVOZs may foster criminality rather than deter it, as prison
have been described as "training grounds" for neophyte criminals. Also, com
munity protection is difficult to achieve because it is limited to the brie
period that NVOZs are incarcerated.
Punishment is achieved by imprisoning NVOZs, but at what cost? From
a fiscal standpoint, imprisoning NVOZs is undesirable. Maintaining the 28
NVq~ sentenced to prison in 1987 costs approximately $4 million pe
year.
Because of the high cost of imprisonment and its minimal benefits fo
NVOZs, Nebraska taxpayers may be the ones who suffer when offenders ar
sentenced to a "quick dip" in prison. The next section examines a reasonab~
priced alternative to prison for NVOZs that both punishes criminals and
protects the community.

ISP: A Viable Alternative for NVOZs in Nebraska

ISPs have been called "prisons without walls" (New Jersey Administra~
Office of the Courts 1988). They feature rigorous supervision of offendeJS,
surveillance, curfews, drug testing, mandatory employment and commUllity
service, and strict rule enforcement. ISPs may include additional featlJlCl
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such as restitution, fines, house arrest, and electronIc monitoring
(Burkhardt 1986).
Nebraska policymakers considering using ISP to alleviate prison overcrowding need to consider the following basic questions:
1. How are program participants selected?
2. How are program participants supervised?
3. How well does ISP protect the community?
4. How cost-effective is ISP?
5. How effective is ISP in reducing the prison population?
6. What are the additional benefits of ISP?
7. How politically acceptable is ISP?
8. How practical are supervision fees as a way of funding ISP?

Selection Procedures
The decision to use ISP can be made at different stages in the processing
of an offender and by different officials in the justice system. The most
noteworthy decision points are at sentencing, at probation and parole
revocation proceedings, and at sentence review or resentencing hearings
after a prison sentence has been given.
Criteria for program eligIbility vary from state to state. All ISP programs
try to assess the risks presented by each offender. Sometimes only first-time
,)ffenders are eligIble; usually violent offenders are disqualified. Probation
lfficers and judges also consider other criteria such as whether the offender
as untreatable drug or alcohol problems, an unstable family situation,
nd/or a poor employment record.
The selection rules in Georgia's Intensive Probation Supervision (IPS)
1rogram stipulate that participants be "serious but nonviolent offenders"
~ho, without the intensive supervision option, would have gone to prison in
the jurisdiction under which they were sentenced· (Erwin 1986a,18). This
leads to rejecting high-risk individuals and probation revocation cases.
Georgia's IPS uses two methods for selecting offenders. In one process,
offenders who have already been sent to prison are chosen. Inmates are
screened for potential assignment to IPS, and recommendations are made to
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the sentencing judges to resentence offenders to IPS. In the other methOd,
judges sentence offenders directly to IPS (Erwin 1986a).
The latter route raises questions about whether IPS results in true dive
sion. Analysis of the offender groups assigned to regular probation, IPS, an~
prison in Georgia shows that sixty percent of the IPS clients had profiles that
were more similar to prison inmates than to probationers (U.S. Bureau of
Justice Assistance 1987). This implies that forty percent of the IPS Clients
were not diverted from prison and that IPS may have been used as an add-on
punishment instead of an alternative to prison for some offenders. It also
suggests that claims about money saved (IPS is less expensive than prison)
may need to be moderated in Georgia's case.
New Jersey's Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) has an inventive way
of guaranteeing that its clients are real divertees. In New Jersey, judges
cannot sentence an offender directly to ISP. Instead, offenders may apply to
the program after they reach prison (Pearson and Bibel 1986). ISP officers
screen potential clients. All persons sentenced to a state prison term are
eligible unless they are convicted of homicide, robbery, or sex crimes.
Offenders also may be excluded for having too many prior offenses or a history of violence. Most of those selected for ISP are burglars, minor thieves
small-time drug sellers, and persons convicted of fraud who have served
about four months of their sentence before being released into ISP (Pearson
and BibeI1986).

New Jersey's Intensive Supervision Program (ISP)
has an inventive way of guaranteeing that
its clients are real divertees ... judges cannot sentence
an offender directly to ISP. Instead, offenders
may apply to the program after they reach prison.
After an ISP officer investigates an applicant, an ISP screening board,
which is made up of citizen members, reviews the applicant'S suitability for
ISP and then interviews the applicant to gauge whether there is motivation
to succeed in the program. Next, the board either rejects the case or recommends it to the ISP resentencing panel. A six-judge resentencing panel then
conducts a hearing to decide whether the applicant will remain in prison or
be released into ISP. This panel also reviews the progress of all program
participants every ninety days, hears allegations of program violations, and
decides whether ISP violators will be returned to prison (New Jersey
Administrative Office of the Courts 1988).

23

priSOn overcrowding in Nebraska

While the selection process in New Jersey was set up to ensure diversion
f ISP offenders, one side effect was a slow admissions rate to the program. It
~equired almost a year to reach full caseload (Baird 1984, Clear 1986).

stringency of Supervision
The degree of supervision provided depends on the offender clientele.
periodiC checks made by probation officers, in person and by phone, are the
most common kind of supervision in ISPs. Some jurisdictions use electronic
monitoring.
The Georgia program requires six to twelve months of supervision and
haS three phases. The first two phases each last three months. In Phase I,
there are five contacts with a probation officer per week. This declines to
twO contacts per week by Phase
There is a mandatory curfew of 10:00
p.m. to 6:00 am. during all these phases.
Each offender must perform 132 hours of community service and either
be employed or perform extra community service until a job can be found.
Participation in routine, unannounced alcohol and drug testing is also
required. In addition, each probationer must pay a $10-50 monthly surveillance fee (Erwin 1987).
A team method of supervision is used, with one probation officer and one
surveillance officer assigned to 25 probationers, or one probation officer and
two surveillance officers assigned to 40 probationers. Each offender must
follow behavioral standards, and submit to surveillance adequate to minimize
risk to the community and allow for rehabilitative counseling.
In New Jersey, each offender selected for ISP receives twenty face-to-face
contacts per month during the first fourteen months of an eighteen-month
program. Some offenders are checked frequently for curfew violations by
electronic monitoring, and over eighty percent of the participants are
screened periodically for drugs (Pearson 1985).
New Jersey requires each offender to find employment within thirty days
of release from the program and to perform sixteen hours of community
service per month. Some offenders pay fines or make restitution, and some
receive counseling and treatment for behavioral problems such as drug abuse
(Pearson 1985).
Caseloads in the New Jersey program are about twenty participants per
officer. Officers spend eighty percent of their time directing field supervision.
Most of this time is spent seeing offenders at their homes, jobs, treatment
programs, and community service sites. Officers work flexible hours because
evenings and weekends are prime supervision times. They work out of their
residences and go to regional offices only for paperwork and staff meetings
(New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts 1988).

m.
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Community Protection

Georgia's IPS Program. How well does intensive supervision control
offenders? Georgia reports that of the 2,322 people in its program between
1982 and 1985, 370 (sixteen percent) absconded or had their probation
revoked (Erwin and Bennett 1987). The remaining 1,952 were diverted
successfully from prison. Only 0.8 percent of IPS probationers were COnvicted of any violent personal crimes while under IPS. Most of the IPS
clients' new crimes were violations of drug and alcohol laws, and nOne
resulted in serious bodily injury to a victim (Erwin and Bennett 1987).
A comparison of results for 200 IPS probationers, 200 regular
probationers, and 97 prison releases after an eighteen-month period, shOWed
that IPS probationers had lower reconviction rates (18.5 percent) than either
regular probationers (24.0 percent) or prison releases (42.3 percent) (Erwin
and Bennett 1987). In addition, the IPS group was convicted of fewer serious
new crimes against persons than either of the other two groups. AlthOUgh
more IPS probationers violated the conditions of probation than did regular
probationers (7 percent compared to 4.5 percent), and more IPS
probationers were re-arrested than regular probationers (40.0 percent compared to 35.5 percent), this might be expected because ISP probationers
were so closely supervised that any illegal actions would be extremely difficult
to hide. It was not expected that only 1 of the sample of 200 IPS probationers
would abscond, compared to 4 of the 200 regular probationers (Erwin and
Bennett 1987).
Drug offenders were the most successful in the IPS program. They had a
ninety percent success rate during the eighteen-month follow-up study
period. Random urinalysis, monitoring, frequent contact, and curfews during
the evening and on weekends may be especially effective in controlling drul
offenders (Erwin and Bennett 1987).
New Jersey's ISP Program. New Jersey's program reports that of 1,147
offenders assigned to ISP from 1983 to August 1987, 400 (thirty-five
percent) are still in ISP, 394 (thirty-four percent) have successfully com·
pleted the program, 342 (thirty percent) have been returned to prison, and
11 (one percent) have either died or had their prison sentences overturned.
Among the 342 who were returned to prison, 249 were returned for violating
program rules and 93 for committing new crimes. The high percentage of
participants returning to prison is the result of frequent drug monitoring and
curfew checks (New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts 1988).
Recidivism among New Jersey's ISP graduates has been low. Since 1984,
327 participants have successfully completed ISP. According to New Jersey
State Police criminal history records, only fourteen (four percent) of ISP
graduates since 1984 have been convicted of new offenses. Nine of the
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fourteen graduates were convicted of disorderly persons offenses such as
shoplifting. None of the offenses involved violence (New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts 1988).
The findings from New Jersey are ambiguous. On one hand, ISP
offenders and prison offenders were significantly different in terms of prior
felony convictions, with the ISP group having an average of 2.2 prior felony
convictions compared with an average of 5.1 for inmates in New Jersey's
prisOns. Also, ISP participants were more likely to have jobs at the time of
the current offense and were better educated than prison inmates (Pearson
and BibeI1986). On the other hand, ISP participants during the study period
were real felons - two-thirds of them had prior felony convictions (Pearson
and Bibel1986).

In Georgia, IPS cost nearly $7,000 less than prison,
per offender, each year . ... In New Jersey in 1987,
the annual cost per ISP participant was $5,208,
compared to $22,000 for prison.
The main policy implication of the fmdings on community protection
from both Georgia and New Jersey is this: If certain kinds of offenders are
placed under intensive supervision, there is a limited risk to the community.

Cost-Effectiveness of ISP
One of the appeals of ISP is its relatively low price compared to prison.
Policymakers must decide whether the money that could be saved through
intensive probation justifies its risks and benefits.
In Georgia, IPS costs nearly $7,000 less than prison, per offender, each
year (excluding what might otherwise have been spent on building new
prisons). If all 2,322 offenders placed in IPS from 1982-85 were diverted from
prison, more than $13 million was saved (Erwin and Bennett 1987). One
reason for such a large savings is that Georgia's IPS probationers pay supervision fees.
In New Jersey in 1987, the annual cost per ISP participant was $5,208,
compared to $22,000 for prison. Program costs were further offset because
ISP participants paid federal and state taxes, fines, child support, restitution,
and supervision fees, and contributed free community service. When these
monetary benefits of ISP are considered, the net cost of ISP is less than
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$2,000 per year for each participant (New Jersey Administrative Office 0
the Courts 1988).
On the national level, the Rand Corporation (Petersilia 1986) us~
information from its nationwide survey of innovations in probation to caiCU.
late estimates of annual costs per offender of intensive probation and othel
alternative sentences. Table 7 indicates that intensive probation is mUCh
cheaper than incarceration in jail or prison. Home detention costs nearly the
same as intensive probation, depending on whether electronic monitoring ~
used as part of home detention.
Table 7 - Comparisons of the Costs of Alternative Sentences
-------------------------------------------An--n-ua-I~C-os-t------

~~~~o~fP~ro~~~m~

______________________________~P~er~O~f~re~n=de~r_____
__

Routine probation
Intensive probation
Home detention·
Local jail
Sta te prison

$300-$2,000
$2,000-$7,000
$2,000-$8,500
$8,000-$12,000
$9,000-$20,000

• Costs of the home detention program depend on whether electronic monitoring is used.
Source: Rand Corporation.

Prison Population Reduction
The cost savings promised by intensive probation depend on whether it
actually diverts offenders from prison. Georgia's success in reducing it!
prison population through IPS predicts what could happen if Nebraska weI(
to adopt Georgia's model.
Before establishing IPS in 1982, Georgia had the highest incarceration
rate in the United States. Georgia's elected judges gave harsh sentences and
sent to prison many felons who would not have gone to prison in other state!
(Otten 1987). So Georgia's offenders may be unusually low-risk by national
standards. As the analysis of Nebraska's prison population has shown,
Nebraska also has many low-risk offenders who could be eligible for inten·
sive probation.
Evidence from Georgia, which implemented IPS in 1982, indicates that
following the introduction of IPS (from 1982 through 1985) there was a ten
percent reduction in felons sentenced to prison. During the same period, the
percentage of offenders placed on probation increased ten percent - from
sixty-three percent in 1982 to seventy-three percent in 1985 (Erwin and
Bennett 1987).
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Additional Benefits
In Georgia, IPS probationers produced thousands of hours of public
ervice, such as working at maintenance and other jobs in hospitals, parks,
~y care centers, and charity programs. Even if these hours are valued at
nUniIDum wage, the contnoution to society is large (Erwin and Bennett
1987).
Other benefits can be achieved through intensive probation. For
example, offenders who are placed on intensive probation instead of being
sent to prison do not lose their jobs, and their families are not forced to
receive welfare support. Also, offenders on intensive probation can pay taxes
and make restitution while avoiding the criminal influences of prison.

-

Offenders who are placed on intensive probation
instead of being sent to prison do not lose their jobs,
and their families are not forced to receive welfare support.

political Acceptability
The results of a recent survey of Nebraska's correctional policymakers
show the political feasibility of ISP in Nebraska (Hoffman and Webb 1987).
The survey gauged how receptive the persons who are instrumental in
making correctional policy in Nebraska are to various solutions to the overcrowding problem.
Personal interviews were conducted with selected legislators, correctional
administrators, judges, prosecutors, police administrators, and other criminal
justice officials who form correctional policy in Nebraska. These
policymakers were asked to indicate their approval or disapproval of
different solutions to the prison overcrowding problem.
A major finding of this survey was that there is strong support among
Nebraska policymakers for intensive probation. Eighteen of the 25
policymakers interviewed said they approve of intensive probation for firsttime, nonviolent offenders. Two of the policymakers were neutral to intensive probation, four were opposed, and one was undecided.
Policymakers also were asked whether it would be feasible to implement
intensive probation in Nebraska All of them said it would be politically as
well as economically feasible, as long as taxes were not increased.
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Supervision Fees as a Funding Source
Supervision fees are a potential source of funding ISP in Nebraska. The
National Institute of Corrections (NIC) reports that twenty-three states are
charging supervision fees to probationers and parolees (NIC 1983)
Probation fees partially support Georgia's highly successful IPS (Erwin and
Bennett 1987).
Three types of services for which fees are being charged in other states
are: (1) room and board in transitional residential programs (for example
restitution centers and halfway houses); (2) fees for specific services (fo;
example, substance abuse counseling); and (3) fees for correctional super.
vision (NIC 1983).
The usual method of collecting supervision fees is to charge a unifonn
monthly rate, usually $10 or $15 (NIC 1983). Other methods include a fee
for a specified period of supervision (for example, $100 for six months);
monthly rates set within an allowable range (for example, $10-$50); discre.
tionary rates based on an offender's ability to pay and the costs of probation
services; and a combined flat rate and monthly fee, which requires the
offender to make an initial probation user payment and then pay a monthly
fee (NIC 1983).
To avoid discrimination against poor offenders, supervision fee programs
allow a waiver or reduction of payments in some situations. States waive or
reduce supervision fees for offenders who are physically or mentally
incapable of working, whose income falls below the poverty level, and who
have a large number of dependents to provide for (NIC 1983).
Proponents of supervision fees say that the programs provide substantial
revenue. In the Georgia IPS program, for example, fee collections through
the fITst four years of IPS exceeded total IPS costs (Erwin 1986). This does
not mean that IPS probationers alone have supported the program. IPS was
initially a pilot program in thirteen of Georgia's forty-fIve judicial districts
and was supported partially by fees collected statewide from regular
probationers (Erwin 1986).
Two important questions associated with fee programs are: Who should
receive the revenue? and, How should it be spent? Probation and parole
agencies argue that they are entitled to the money because they use their
resources to collect it. In Georgia, for example, funds are used to support
IPS and other innovations in probation. However, in nine of the 23 states
that collect fees, revenues are returned to the state's general fund, where the
money does not have to be spent on corrections (NIC 1983).
Opponents of supervision claim that fee programs do not generate much
revenue, place unfair burdens on offenders who already have enough financial responsibilities, encourage inequities in the justice system, and risk legal
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nallenges (NIe 1983). NIe data on fee programs in 23 states, however,

~stablish the following facts about these programs:

• Substantial amounts of money can be raised from supervision fee
programs.
• Moderate fees can be collected from a majority of the probation!
parole populations.
• Guidelines can be established to assure equitable enforcement of
supervision fee payments.
• No significant legal challenges have succeeded in curtailing the practice of collecting supervision fees (NIe 1983).

-

National opinion polls indicate that the public
wants criminals punished, but that it is unwilling to pay
for more prisons. Polls also indicate that
the public is supportive of nonprison forms ofpunishment.

The policy implication for Nebraska regarding NIC's findings is that
supervision fees would be a practical way of generating revenue to support
intensive probation. Furthermore, using supervision fees to defray program
costs might make it easier to market ISP to Nebraskans. Money for initiating
IPS, however, would have to come from another source.

Summary and Suggested Policy Actions
Editor's note: The NebraskIJ Probation Administration began planning a pilot intensive probation program in the summer of 1988 (Keller 1988). No details of the program ~ available at the
time of this writing.

Prison overcrowding will remain a serious problem in Nebraska in the
near future. Increases in prison admissions and in lengths of stay are the
main factors adding to Nebraska's prison population. Nebraska's answer to
the problem has been to expand prison capacity and to implement programs
to reduce length of stay.
This strategy of increasing prison capacity is premised on the perception
that the public wants harsh forms of punishment. Indeed, national opinion
polls indicate that the public wants criminals punished, but that it is unwilling to pay for more prisons. Polls also indicate that the public is supportive
of nonprison forms of punishment.
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Nebraska policymakers should give serious consideration to poli
options featuring nonprison forms of punishment. Data from the Nebras~
Parole Board's files show that there currently are many prison inmates who
are not dangerous enough to require imprisonment. Many of these non.
violent offenders with marginal criminal histories could be diverted into
intensive probation programs that are more cost-effective than incarcera.
tion.
Nebraska should develop pilot intensive supervision programs in Omaha
and Lincoln with the goal of reducing prison admissions by 50 to 100
commitments per year. If the goal of the pilot programs is to provide a COst.
effective alternative to prison, safeguards should be established to ensure
that diversion takes place. The selection of inappropriate offenders for ISP
(for example, those who do not require additional control and who WOuld
not ordinarily be sent to prison) wastes program space and causes an
increase in correctional costs (Mathias 1986).

Nebraska should develop pilot intensive supervision programs
in Omaha and Lincoln with the goal of reducing
prison admissions by 50 to 100 commitments per year.
Carefully designed procedures for monitoring the implementation of
selection methods are the best precautionary measures. Because of the
tendency of some Nebraska judges to sentence NVOZs to prison, it is
unlikely that a large enough part of the target popUlation could be diverted
through a selection method like Georgia's, which makes intensive probation
a judicial sentencing option. A more effective method would be one like New
Jersey's, which considers only offenders who have already received a prison
sentence. One drawback, however, is that this method is slow in admitting
offenders into programs.
Successful implementation of ISP pilot programs in Nebraska will require
that the public's demand for punishment be satisfied. Policymakers should
tailor pilot programs to serve as punishment as well as diversion. New Jersey
runs the most punitive program, selecting offenders only after they have
been imprisoned. New Jersey's approach combines elements of probation
and incarceration.
Nebraska policymakers may want to consider requiring offenders to
spend a brief period, such as 30 days, in prison before selection for ISP. Such
an approach has the advantages of providing more protection to the
community and of possibly shocking offenders into a realization that they
must end their criminal involvement. Disadvantages are that adding a shock
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feature to ISP increases the costs of the program (because a short time in
prison costs more than a short time in IPS) and subjects ISP clients to the
potentially negative influences of prison.
The punitive benefits of intensive probation can also be increased by
including multiple requirements. Programs in New Jersey and Georgia, for
example, require offenders to perform community service without pay, to pay
fines and supervision fees, to submit to frequent drug testing, to engage in
full-time work, to abide by curfews, to participate in counseling, and to make
restitution to victims.

-

ISP is a proven, cost-effective approach for
alleviating prison overcrowding.

The issue of punitiveness of the pilot programs has public relations
dimensions. Developers of ISP programs in Nebraska should be concerned
with gaining public support for the placement of ISP offenders in the
community. One strategy that has worked in other states is to form an ISP
advisory group including citizens, the media, and representatives of criminal
justice agencies (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1987).
Beyond these issues in program development and implementation,
Nebraska policymakers need to realize that ISP is a realistic policy choice.
ISP is a proven, cost-effective approach for alleviating prison overcrowding;
it has the potential for meeting the public's demand for punishment; and
equally important, it is economically and politically feasible.
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Endnotes
1. This study is modeled after the prison diversion studies conducted in Michigan (BYnu
Morash, Davidson, and Basta 1987) and New York (Mathias 1986).
Ill,

2. Drug offenses include the crimes of administering narcotics to addicts, dealing in narcor
or controlled substances, possessing a controlled substance except marijuana, possessing m~CS
than one pound of marijuana, delivering or distributing a dangerous substance, and (for re;
tered persons) intentionally violating drug laws.
3.

This money was made available through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.

4. The mean or average is not as useful as the median for examining length of stay over tim
because extreme values affect the mean. The median is simply the middle number in a distribu~
tion.
5. DCS data indicate that longer sentences have not been a major factor contributing to
increases in length of stay. The median minimum sentence actually decreased from 18 months
in 1978 to 14 months in 1986, while the median maximum sentence was 36 months for every
year from 1978 to 1986 (DCS 1986d).
6. To speed the parole process, the Nebraska Parole Board recently advanced parole hearing
schedules in order to permit the early identification and release of parole-eligible inmates. This
allows more time to develop approved living and work arrangements, assuring that fewer
paroles are delayed beyond eligible release dates. The parole board also increased the frequency
of parole hearings to clear backlogs of "quick dippers," or prisoners who are sentenced to one
year or less for committing Class I misdemeanors (Bartee 1988). As a result of these and other
efforts, the number of adult parolees in Nebraska jumped from 283 in February of 1987 to 420
in February of 1988 (DCS 1988).
7. Although the number of males in Nebraska who are between the ages of eighteen and
thirty-nine peaked at 291,695 in 1985, the projection of males between these ages for 1990 is
289,144, which is not a very significant decrease (DCS 1986e).
8. The rated capacities of the Nebraska State Penitentiary and the Lincoln Correctional
Center are 150 percent of their design capacities. (Design capacity is the number of inmates
that planners or architects intended for a facility.) DCS administrators have determined the
rated capacities of Nebraska's other prisons in terms of design, population and staffing (DCS
1986a).
9. Data on the average square feet per cell at the Nebraska Center for Women were unavail·
able.
10. Gaes and McGuire (1984) used longitudinal data, multiple institutions, and multiple
measures of overcrowding, and also controlled for inmate characteristics (for example, age and
prior record) and inmate prison activities (for example, education and work assignment).
11. The Nebraska Legislature approved part of the DCS request and provided money for the
renovation of the Hastings facility, which opened in 1987. DCS plans to resubmit its proposal
for funds to build the other two proposed correctional facilities (Falconer 1988).
12. DCS also uses prerelease, work release, and furloughs to relieve pressure on the prisons
from overpopulation.
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13. This estimate was derived by multiplying the per capita cost of housing an inmate at the
omaha Correctional Center ($13,983) by the number of male NVOb sentenced to prison in
1987 (N = 235), by multiplying the per capita cost of housing an inmate at the Nebraska Center
f r Women ($21,331) by the number of female NVOb sentenced to prison in 1987 (N = 46),
o d by summing the totals. This method may Slightly overestimate costs because it counts the 54
a~fenders who were admitted and discharged in 1987 as staying in prison all year, and some
Offenders may be placed in community corrections centers (which are cheaper than prisons)
~fore the end of their first year in prison. This overcounting, however, would be partially
counterbalanced by the male NVOb who are sent to the Nebraska State Penitentiary, where
the per capita cost is $17,045, instead of the Omaha Correctional Center.
14. Hou~ arrest programs restrict offenders' free-time activities in order to reduce their
opportunities to commit crimes. The least restrictive form of house arrest involves curfews; the
roost restrictive form uses a computer and an electronic monitoring device to monitor compliance with program requirements. House arrest may be part of ISP, or it may exist apart from
ISP, as is the case with Nebraska's house parole program.
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appropriations would have been required to have a net positive
impact on Nebraska before the export permit could be issued.
Explicitly limited surface water interbasin transfers, groundwater
municipal transfers, and groundwater industrial transfers to instate
transfers, thus requiring anyone wishing to export water under these
statutes to obtain an export permit.

LB 151, the second bill introduced during 1987, was similar to LB 146 in:
•
•
•

Authorizing a water exports and transfers study;
Making surface water rights freely transferable; and
Restricting surface water exports, interbasin transfers, groundwater
municipal transfers, and groundwater industrial transfers to instate
transfers only.

However, LB 151 went further than LB 146 in giving the Water Manage_
ment Board responsibility for promoting water exports. LB 151 would have
authorized the board to find buyers for Nebraska's water, construct water
export projects, and use the profits from export water sales to construct new
water projects in Nebraska. LB 151 also authorized instate groundwater
transfers for any purpose, greatly expanding instate groundwater transfer
authorities. However, the quantity of groundwater that could be transferred
could not exceed current withdrawals from an existing well or net annual
recharge for withdrawals from new wells, both of which would have severely
limited groundwater transfers. Finally, half of the proceeds received by
Nebraska landowners from private groundwater exports would be paid to the
state to help construct water projects.
Water Export Policy Assumptions. LB 146 and LB 151 were based on
two premises: That Sporhase requires states to treat instate water uses and
exports exactly the same, and that Nebraska, having abundant groundwater
supplies, should sell some of its surplus water to further water resource
development within the state. While neither premise is unreasonable, they
both can be challenged First, Sporhase allows states to establish a limited
preference for instate water uses, although the limits of that preference have
yet to be defined. This contradicts the notion that whatever applies to
exports must apply equally to instate uses. Thus, the challenge is not simply
to come up with instate policies that will accomplish water export policy
objectives - although that is a critical part of any water export strategy. The
challenge is to test the Sporhase decision by creatively defining in statutes
and administrative practice a limited instate preference that protects important local values and purposes - economic and noneconomic alike - that do
not impermissibly intrude upon interstate commerce. While this is no easy
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task, it is a choice which should not be simply dismissed, as it was in LB 146
andLB 151.
The second premise, that Nebraska has surplus water which should be
sold to facilitate water resource development, is even more controversial.
The definition of surplus is subjective and depends entirely upon the values
one wishes to protect. For example, if one wishes to protect wet meadows in
the Sandhills or to maintain streamflows in the Loup River system, there is
little surplus groundwater in Nebraska. If, however, providing clean drinking
water to residents of the Southwest is considered fIrst, the protection of the
wet meadows in the Sandhills to maintain a ranching economy and way of life
has lower political priority, and there is surplus water in Nebraska.

LB 146 and LB 151 were based on two premises:
That Sporhase requires states to treat instate water uses
and exports exactly the same, and that Nebraska, having
abundant groundwater supplies, should sell some of its
surplus water to further water resource development
within the state. While neither premise is
unreasonable, they both can be challenged.
Even assuming that, for the sake of argument, there is surplus water
available in Nebraska, selling it to construct water resource projects to
increase or maintain irrigation is questionable. Since World War II, one of
the major farm policy issues has been coping with grain surpluses. While
there have been brief periods of low grain stocks and high world grain prices,
the last three decades have been characterized by surplus grain. This has led
to federal programs to pay farmers not to plant grain, which has been an
important factor in reduced federal spending for water projects: it does not
pay to increase irrigation of surplus crops, especially when the producers of
those crops are then entitled to federal crop subsidies. The double-subsidy
aspect of federal water projects - using irrigation water subsidized by federal
taxpayers to grow surplus crops for which the taxpayers must pay again has helped critics of the federal reclamation program curtail program
funding.
To suggest, then, that Nebraska should sell its water so that it can build
water projects to produce additional crop surpluses ignores economic reality.
Improved production techniques in South America and Asia have allowed
other countries to produce grain at least as cheaply as it can be produced in
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Nebraska. And biotechnology holds the further promise of increased yields
without irrigation. Thus, a policy based on selling water to increase surplus
crop production is short sighted and may lead to the economic demise of
those it seeks to help.

If Nebraska decides to export its water for money,
developing new irrigation projects is not the only potential
use of this new state revenue and is clearly not
the most desirable use.
The use of state proceeds from water exports is an important decision
which deserves wide debate. Groundwater quality protection, soil conserva.
tion, and instream flows protection are simply a beginning in terms of
important natural resources programs that deserve increased state funding.
Other alternative uses of state revenues from water exports are: education,
economic development, and transportation improvements. The point is that
if Nebraska decides to export its water for money, developing new irrigation
projects is not the only potential use of this new state revenue and is clearly
not the most desirable use.
In summary, LB 146 and LB 151 are based on the mistaken premise that
water exports and water right exports are inevitable and therefore the state
should attempt to take ftnancial advantage of the situation. While Nebraska
does need to evaluate policy options carefully relative to Sporhase, it must
evaluate all possible options, not simply those that lend themselves to
increased water development.
Political Response. Both LB 146 and LB 151 contain several contro·
versial and emotionally charged issues: that the state should aggressively sell
its water, that water rights should be freely transferable, and that interbasin
groundwater transfers should be authorized. Each issue alone would
generate significant political controversy; the combination of all three issues
in any single bill would make it politically impossible to enact. This W&
borne out in the public hearings on LB 146 and LB 151.
The hearings demonstrated that people generally did not comprehend all
aspects of the proposed bills, and in any event there was little political
support for enacting the bills into law. Interested groups, including the
Nebraska Farm Bureau, the Nebraska Farmers Union and the Nebraska
Sierra Club, generally voiced support for only the study provisions of LB 146
and opposed the more aggressive water export promotion of LB 151. After
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the hearings, the Natural Resources Committee approved only the water
xport study provisions and removed all other provisions from LB 146.
~rovisions removing the requirement for legislative approval for surface
water exports were added to LB 146 by amendment and the bill was enacted
into law.

Studying Water Exports and Transfers in Nebraska
As finally enacted, LB 146 recited legislative findings that surface water
and groundwater were being transferred from the land where they occurred
to users within and outside of Nebraska, and that such transfers were likely
to increase as water shortages occurred within and outside of Nebraska. The
legislature also found that Nebraska enjoyed generally abundant water
supplies and a chronic overabundance in some areas. Finally, the legislature
declared that state government should provide an orderly mechanism for
transferring water from areas of surplus to areas of shortage, to provide for
compensating individual landowners and the public for such transfers, and to
balance the rights of individual landowners and the public against the free
market forces that compel the use of water where it brings the greatest
economic return.
LB 146 then directed the Water Management Board to prepare a study
which would:

• Analyze current legal, statutory, physical, social, environmental and
economic impediments to surface and groundwater transfers;
• Develop a statutory framework to permit water transfers while
protecting the environment and the rights of landowners and the
public;
• Develop a statutory framework to compensate those harmed by water
transfers and also the state of Nebraska on behalf of the general
public;
• Identify potential users and markets for water exports, transfers, and
water right sales;
• Identify economically feasible water transfer and export opportunities; and
• Identify an appropriate state role in facilitating and regulating water
right transfers ~llld exports.
The report was presented to the legislature and governor November 30,
1988. A draft report was made available July 15, 1988, and the public comment period ended August 30, 1988.
The final version of LB 146 as adopted by the Unicameral contained the
same limiting assumptions that were in its original version: that water
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The LB 146 study does not evaluate the entire range

-

of legal and political options available to respond to
the Sporhase decision, but rather only a subset of
those options which are favorable to water development.

exports and transfers are inevitable and Nebraska should try to take
advantage of the situation. The LB 146-mandated study was not required to
include either an evaluation of Sporhase or a definition of the legal limits of
the Sporhase decision, and in fact makes the same simplifying assumption.
Thus the LB 146 study was not intended to evaluate the entire range of legal
and political options available to respond to the Sporhase decision, but
rather only a subset of those options favorable to water development.
Despite the limitations imposed by the legislature, the Water Manage_
ment Board study provides a careful analysis of potential water transfers and
exports and their impacts on Nebraska. The July 15, 1988, draft report
included five proposed bills to meet the requirements of LB 146. The topics
addressed by the five proposed bills are as follows (see table 1 for a COmparison of these bills with current water laws, and with additional policy
options discussed in the concluding section of the chapter):
•
•
•
•
•

Water transfer regulations,
Rights to saved water,
Water use fees,
State water transfer promotion, and
State water transfer projects.

Each bill, if introduced, will be highly controversial.

Water Transfers Regulation
If enacted, the first draft bill would represent a major departure from past
water legislation in Nebraska. The bill would authorize water rights transfers
and establish uniform rules for both surface and groundwater exports and
instate transfers. The bill would define for the first time in Nebraska what
constitutes a transfer of groundwater and would require permits for
groundwater transfers away from the section within which the well is located
However, permits would not be required for groundwater used solely for
domestic (household, not including livestock watering) purposes or for the
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Table 1 ~ Effect of Water Management Board-Proposed Bi.J.b on Nebraska's Water Policies

Cilrrent Policy

WMB Proposal

Other Alternatives

""Z
Instate interbasm Groundwater Transfers

Instate Imerbasin Surface
Wa1erTrans.[ers

Surface water and groundwater
can be exported with
DWR permit, permits may
be denied in public interest

Allowed for municipal and
industrial purposes only
with DWR permit

Allow for any purpose with
DWR permit if state
benefits outweigh state
environmental and
economic costs.

Could be sold for different
purposes in different river
basins and across state lines.

Same plus new environmental

Allow agricultural groundwater transfers (as well
as municipal, industrial
transfers) on same basis
as water exports.

Make surface water
transfers subject to
same requirements
as exports (public
interest, environmental
impact statement).

a. Limit purposes for which
water rights can be

a. Do nothing.

Make transfers subject to
strict groundwater use
regulations to prevent
or limit depletion.

Make transfers subject
to instream flow
requirements.

Surface Water Right Sales

Water Exports

Can be sold for same
purpose within same
river basin.

purchased to instream
flows protection.
b. Limit purposes for which
water rights can be
purchased to water
exchanges.

impact .tatement and
mitigation/compensation
required.

b. Discourage exports by better
defining public interest
factors to protect Nebraska
water uses.
c. Discourage ground water
exports by regulating
groundwater use to reduce
or prevent groundwater
depletion.
d. Discourage surface water
exports by .. tablishing

'"0-01

~

";

~

1i

minimum stream flow
reQuirements.

e. G~e .tate greater control
(JIIer exports through state
water leasing.
t Explore Sporha.re instate
water use preference.

......
......
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irrigation of up to 160 acres of an adjacent section. The new requirements
would apply to virtually all surface water appropriation applications except
instream flow applications, and to all nonexempt groundwater transfers off
the section where the well is located. Thus, groundwater transfers for
agricultural purposes would be authorized for the first time in Nebraska.
A permit would be required from the DWR for groundwater and
surface-water transfers and exports, and surface water rights sales. The
applicant would be required to prepare a full impact analysis of the propOsed
transfer, export, or water rights sale. The required impact analysis, which is
modeled after federal environmental impact statement requirements, wOuld
include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The social, economic, physical, and environmental effects of the
proposed action;
Any unavoidable adverse impacts;
Alternatives to the proposed action;
The relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity;
Any irreversible and irretrievable resource commitments; and
Alternatives and recommendations when the proposed action
involves unresolved conflicts regarding alternative resource uses.

Transfers, exports, or water rights sales involving small quantities of water,
or obviously having no adverse impacts, would be administratively exempted
from the impact statement requirement. The impact statement requirement
would provide environmental protection requirements not available in water
rights proceedings, an important innovation.
The DWR director would first determine, in consultation with
appropriate state agencies, whether any of the adverse effects identified in
the impact statement could be avoided through compensation or mitigation.
For example, if a proposed groundwater transfer or export would lower the
water levels in nearby wells, that adverse impact could be mitigated by agreeing to pay the costs of installing deeper wells. The same adverse impact could
be avoided through compensating those landowners whose wells would be
harmed by the groundwater transfer or export by paying for the replacement
of their wells. Similarly, if a surface water diversion would interfere with
wildlife habitat, that adverse impact could be mitigated by agreeing to
minimum flow requirements to maintain habitat during critical periods, or by
providing substitute water or habitat. If the DWR director determined that
such compensation or mitigation was appropriate, the director would be
required to specify such measures as a condition to granting the permit.
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After the DWR director had considered how to handle adverse impacts,
the proposed transfer permit, export permit, or water rights transfer permit

would be required to be approved:
•
•

If the applicant agreed to all conditions imposed by the director;
If the director determined that the benefits of the proposed use or

transfer would clearly outweigh any adverse impacts which could be
avoided, compensated or mitigated; and
• If the proposed action was consistent with all other applicable laws,
such as the Nebraska endangered species act.
If anyone of these three requirements was not met, the permit would be
required to be denied in the public interest.
In determining whether the benefits of the proposed water transfer or
use clearly outweighed any unavoidable, uncompensable, and unmitigated
adverse impacts, the director's considerations would be required to include:
• The economic, environmental and other benefits of the proposed use
or transfer;
• The nature and extent of remaining adverse social, economic, physical
and environmental impacts of the proposed transfer or use;
• Opportunities for future water uses foregone if the proposed transfer
or use were permitted;
• Alternative actions and water sources available to the applicant; and
• Any other factors the director deemed relevant to the public interest
and to the health and safety of Nebraska's citizens.
Any permits granted would be conditional on payment of the first annual
permit fee for the water used or transferred. Permits could be granted for up
to fifty years, although a permit may be renewed following the same
procedures as for the original application. Groundwater transfers and
exports would be limited to no more than 60,000 acre-feet annually - the
amount of the largest groundwater transfer (from the Platte River to
Omaha) currently occurring in Nebraska. The quantity of water that could
be sold with a transfer of surface water appropriations would be the amount
of water historically consumed, not the entire amount of water diverted This
would protect the return flows for downstream users.
The proposed bill is a thoughtful implementation of a comprehensive
water transfer policy. The impact statement requirement establishes a potential for substantial environmental protection in water rights proceedings not
available under current law. This is a significant innovation, although the
effectiveness of this protection depends entirely upon how such a policy
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would be implemented by the DWR director. Perhaps more importantly, the
bill gives the DWR director implicit authority to tip the scales in favor of
instate uses through the wildcard public interest criterion. Thus, although
the LB 146 study did not explicitly explore the possibility of favoring instate
water uses beyond pubic health and safety requirements in water expOrt
proceedings, the proposed water transfer bill is broad enough to give the
DWR director sufficient discretion to make that distinction. The bill also
shows potential exporters how to avoid that public interest determination
through compensation and mitigation of adverse impacts.

The impact statement requirement establishes a potential
for substantial environmental protection in water rights
proceedings not available under current law.
While the proposed bill gives the DWR director discretion to establish
substantial environmental protection conditions and conditions to protect
local water users, the effectiveness of this approach depends entirely upon
how the director would implement this authority. Recent DWR administrative decisions suggest that the director might be more protective of water
development objectives than of environmental protection. In issuing water
rights for a proposed Platte River irrigation project, the DWR director
dismissed a rmding by the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission that the
project would harm endangered wildlife species and concluded instead that
the project could not harm wildlife (Pearson and Aiken 1987). Presumably
the DWR director's attitudes toward water development and environmental
protection might change if the circumstances pitted export water uses
against protection of Nebraska environmental resources.
A related issue is groundwater depletion. While the DWR director would
have authority to implement a no-depletion policy, the director's discretion
would also allow a depletion policy to be implemented if compensation or
mitigation were provided. Natural resource districts, however, would be
authorized to establish more restrictive groundwater allocation policies
within groundwater control areas, and these stricter policies would apply to
exporters. Thus, if an NRD wanted to limit groundwater withdrawals for
local use and export use to no more than average annual recharge,
groundwater depletion from water exports could be avoided. However, an
area with abundant groundwater supplies might have difficulty persuading
the DWR to approve control area designation (Aiken 1980).
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Rights to Saved Water
The second bill would establish rights to saved water and authorize
ansfers of the saved water (see table 1). Saved water - also called salvaged
rater- refers to water which normally would be consumed or lost in a water
:e but which is instead saved through an improved use or other wateraving technology. A common example is lining previously unlined irrigation
~itches, thus reducing water seepage from the canals. In some states,
municipalities have shared the cost of lining irrigation canals in exchange for
a share of the saved water. One difficulty is determining how much water has
really been saved through the improved practices. Water that might appear
to be lost may in fact return to the stream or groundwater basin, where it is
used by others.
Under the proposed saved water bill, a surface water appropriator
wishing to install a water-saving practice or technology would first file a
conservation proposal with the Department of Water Resources, describing
how the practice would save water. The DWR might approve the water
conservation proposal if it determined the plan was feasible, would conserve
water, could be implemented without injuring existing water rights, and was
not contrary to the public interest. Once the applicant completed the conservation proposal, the DWR would determine the quantity of water saved. Any
water conserved might be used by the applicant to irrigate additional land,
reserved for future use, or sold for any purpose, including instream flows.
The proposed bill would provide financial incentives to save water by
allowing the appropriator to sell or otherwise use the saved water. The
difficulty and controversy would come in determining the actual quantity of
water saved. The return flows issue would be just as controversial in
Nebraska water rights proceedings as they are in other states.
t

Water Use Fees
The water use fee bill is the vehicle for providing financing for Nebraska
water projects (see table 1). The bill would require payment of water use fees
by:

• Groundwater users irrigating more than 160 acres across a section
line,
• Other groundwater users transporting more than 250 acre-feet across
a section line annually,
• Surface water users diverting more than five cubic feet per second or
using more than 1,000 acre-feet annually,
• Owners of groundwater recharge reservoirs recharging more than
1,000 acre-feet per year, and
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•

Surface water storage reservoir owners storing more than 1,000 acre.
feet per year.

The water use fees would vary, depending on the purpose of use. Fo
public water supply systems (municipal and rural domestic water users) t~
fee would be $5 per acre-foot or $8 per service connection (user's chOice)
For irrigation use, the charge would be $0.50 per a~re foot or $1 per acr~
irrigated (user's choice). For industrial, commercial, and power uses, the
charge would be $1 per acre-foot. The fees collected would be available for
water development (reservoir construction) purposes.
The water use fee is likely to be the most controversial feature of the
water transfers legislative proposals. The fees would be applied to both
instate uses and out-of-state uses. Most irrigation uses would be exempted,
but many municipal, rural domestic, and industrial users would be required
to pay the fees, as would all water exporters. If the fee were im}>Osed
immediately, it would raise approximately $7 million annually. As disCUSsed

The water use fee is likely to be the most controversial
feature of the water transfers legislative proposals.

-

earlier, there is a real question as to whether revenue such as this should be
used for increased water development.

Water Right Transfers Clearinghouse
Another proposed bill would require the Water Management Board to
maintain a list of prospective buyers and sellers of water rights and to
distribute a transfer guide containing information about the transfer procea
(see table 1). This clearinghouse function would facilitate the water rights
transfers or sales process, and would provide buyers and sellers with infor·
mation regarding how to buy and sell water rights. The bill is simply an addi·
tional option to facilitate the water rights transfer process if such transfen
are authorized.

State Water Transfer Projects
The last proposed water transfers bill would authorize the WatfJ
Management Board to establish its own water projects (see table 1). TIl
projects could be for any purpose, including water export. The board couW
also participate in water projects sponsored by other entities. Board watcl
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projects would be funded either from legislative appropriations or from
ater use fees,
VI Enacting this bill would have little consequence until substantial amounts
of rnoney were available for water transfer project development. If, for
exarnple, the water use fee were enacted and all or most of the money
llocated to water transfer project development, the program would have
a'gnificant effects on encouraging instate water transfers and water exports.
~~ the absence of such aggressive funding, however, the program would have
rttle significance. The important issue is program funding rather than the
~etails of the water transfers project development program itself.

Additional Policy Alternatives
As indicated earlier, LB 146 was based on the questionable premises that
the Sporhase decision requires states to treat water exports on the same basis
as inState water uses and that water exports represent an attractive financial
opportunity for the state of Nebraska. As a result the LB 146 study examined
only policy options that would encourage and facilitate exporting water from
Nebraska. Alternatives to limit water exports, such as those policies
developed by New Mexico, were not considered. A broader range of policy
alternatives are available to Nebraskans, more than those considered in the
LB 146 water transfers study. Additional policy alternatives include a more
limited authorization of water rights transfers, more restrictive groundwater
allocation policies, state water appropriation and water marketing, and the

The LB 146 study examined only policy options that would
encourage and facilitate exporting water from Nebraska.
Alternatives to limit water exports, such as those policies
developed by New Mexico, were not considered. A broader
range ofpolicy alternatives are available to Nebraskans.
riskier option of exploring the boundaries of the limited instate preference
authorized by the Sporhase decision (see table 1 for an overview).

Water Exports and Transfers Policy Alternatives
The major political concern regarding water exports and instate interbasin water transfers is that the areas from which the water is exported will
be irreparably harmed. Sandhills residents foresee wet meadows drying up,
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streamflows diminishing, wetlands disappearing, and, in the extreme, the
Sandhills blowing away. While these fears are exaggerated, there could be
significant local groundwater effects extending perhaps several miles from a
withdrawal site if significant quantities of Sandhills groundwater were
withdrawn. The policy issue is whether the harm is irreparable or whether it
can be compensated or mitigated. These are complicated factual determina_
tions that must be made on a case-by-case basis.
The political fact that Sandhills residents may have to accept, unpleasant
as it may be, is that if water is needed by a more populous region, the thirsty
population will find political ways to quench its thirst. The choice that the
water transfer legislative proposals offer residents of water-rich areas is
whether that water will be purchased or, instead, obtained through pOlitical
fiat.
There are many different scales of possible water transfers and exports.
Most transfers or exports are likely to be similar to the Sporhase transfer
itself: Small quantities moved over short distances. Larger quantities
imported over longer distances quickly become expensive and will be a last
resort among water supply options. For example, the cities of Phoenix,
Tucson, Denver, and Los Angeles will find it much less expensive to
purchase local irrigation water rights and convert them to municipal use or
to develop local water supplies than seeking to import groundwater from
Nebraska. In the near future, importing Nebraska groundwater to these
regions is simply not cost-effective. While large-scale exports are possible in
the future, they are probably at least a generation away. This does not mean
that this possibility should be dismissed, but rather that if Nebraska
authorizes water transfers and exports it will not immediately result in massive exports of water.
A more likely result is the interbasin transfer of groundwater for irrigation purposes. Several areas of the state, including the central Platte River,
Blue River, and Republican River basins, are facing groundwater depletion
from irrigation. These regions are competing for Platte River water rights to
build surface water irrigation projects to replace some but not all of the
groundwater supply being depleted. Whether any of these proposed projects
will be successful depends largely on whether the state or federal government
is willing to share in paying the project costs. In any event, there is a greater
demand for supplemental irrigation water than the Platte River can supply
even under the most optimistic assumptions (Aiken 1987). Therefore,
irrigators who do not secure a Platte River water project will look to alternative water sources, including Sandhills groundwater. Interbasin groundwater
transfers could become the water source for new irrigation projects if state
financing for such projects (for example, from a state water use fee) can be
generated.
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The LB 146 water transfers study proposes to authorize instate and intertate water transfers with strong mitigation and compensation requirements.
~ith this background, several additional policy alternatives appear worthy of
consideration.
Do Nothing. One option is to make no substantial policy changes. In this
scenario the current surface and groundwater export statutes would be
retained without major change. Statutory changes that should be considered,
however, include clarifying that groundwater cannot be exported under a
municipal or industrial groundwater transfer permit without also obtaining a
groundwater export permit.
This policy would provide some protection to Nebraska groundwater
uses in that the Department of Water Resources director has broad, if
implicit, discretion under current statutes to tip the scales toward instate
uses in evaluating proposed water exports. In addition, Nebraska landowners
would not have the opportunity to sell the groundwater underlying their land
for export. This approach would reduce current political controversy, deferring it to the future.
Discourage Exports. A second option would be to discourage exports by
better defining the public interest criterion in surface and groundwater
export statutes to include a greater consideration of future instate water
needs. This could include the possibility of water transfers and higher water
use charges for exports. Basically, this option would explore the boundaries
of the limited instate preference of Sporhase.
Strictly Allocate Groundwater. Nebraska is one of only a few western
states that does not allocate groundwater similarly to surface water. Given
approval in the Sporhase decision of strict water conservation measures
applied across the board, Nebraska could establish strict groundwater allocations to achieve stated aquifer life objectives.
A very modest objective would be to require groundwater supplies to last
at least forty years and to restrict withdrawals and well drilling accordingly.
This requirement in Colorado forced Mr. Sporhase to corne to Nebraska for
water to irrigate his Colorado land: that state had already closed his area to
further drilling to prevent groundwater depletion in less than forty years. In
some areas where supplies were more abundant or groundwater development less widespread, a 100-year minimum useful life might be a more
appropriate policy objective. This would be more restrictive, but it would
provide a higher degree of resource protection. To accomplish a perpetual
useful life - the stated policy of most natural resource districts in Nebraska
- would require limiting total withdrawals to average annual recharge. This
restrictive approach would be most feasible in an area such as the Sandhills,
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where recharge is significant and where irrigation is not as widely develOPed
as in other regions of Nebraska.
The effect of these restrictive policies would be to discourage large-scale
groundwater exports. For example, low volume exports to small communities
or rural water districts would probably not be affected by strict groundwater
allocation policies; large exports to Denver, Phoenix or Los Angeles wOuld.
Local groundwater development would also be restricted, which may be one
reason this option was not pursued by the Water Management Board in the
water transfers study.
Protect Instream Flows. A similar policy could be established for surface
water through state water reservations or appropriations for instream
purposes in order to maintain existing streamflows and associated environ_
mental values. Such a policy would be favored not only by environmental
interests, but also by Platte Valley municipalities depending upon Platte
River recharge of municipal wellfields, such as is the case for Omaha,
Lincoln, Grand Island and Fremont.
State Water Leasing. One option worthy of more detailed consideration
is for Nebraska to appropriate its unappropriated water to the state itself
and then make that water available for use on a lease basis rather than by
appropriation. A similar policy has been adopted by Montana, ostensibly to
insulate the state from the Sporhase decision. The basic theory is that if the
state is leasing rights to use water rather than allocating water rights, the
state has entered the market directly rather than regulating market activity
and therefore is not subject to the interstate commerce clause (Tarlock
1988). If the state is a market participant rather than a market regulator, the
state may favor its own citizens in, for example, marketing the state's water.
This might include charging higher prices for water exports than for instate
water uses, even prices making exports prohibitively expensive. The market
participation strategy has not yet been legally tested regarding water exports,
but it is an option worth further consideration if Nebraska policy makers
determine the state is better served by using Nebraska water in Nebraska
rather than by selling it for export.
Instate Water Use Preferences. The final water exports strategy is to
build on the implied Sporhase instate preference. The Sporhase decision
suggests that in states where water is publicly owned, public ownership may
justify favoring instate use over water exports beyond public health
considerations. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court did not explain what
it meant when it said this. Ultimate resolution of this issue will require
additional litigation of state water export policies, similar to that of El Paso I
and II, including further litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court. What this
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inState preference suggests, however, is that states may be free to pursue
alternatives to favor instate use over water exports, and that this can be done
through vehicles other than the Nebraska reciprocity clause.
How might an instate preference be advanced? The easiest way is to
require positive net benefits to Nebraska from all proposed water appropriatioDS, including water exports. If a proposed export would interfere with
existing water uses, harm environmental values, and provide economic
benefits only outside Nebraska, the project would have no benefits to
Nebraska and the state might be justified (under the implied Sporhase instate
preference) in denying the application. The appropriation criteria could be
refined to require net benefits in every evaluation category; that is, positive
net water supply benefits to Nebraska, positive net economic benefits to
Nebraska, and positive net environmental benefits to Nebraska from any
proposed appropriation (including exports). If exporters must score positively on every evaluation criterion, the cost of water exports would be
increased substantially: new wells would have to be drilled or well owners
compensated for lowered groundwater tables; streamflow would need to be
augmented to compensate for stream-depletion effects of groundwater
pumping; and local governments would need to be compensated for reduced
property tax receipts if groundwater declines lowered land values.
The basic policy issue is whether water exports are good or bad for
Nebraska. LB 146 uncritically concludes that exports are good and should be
vigorously pursued. The public response to LB 146 suggests that Nebraskans

States may be free to pursue alternatives to favor instate
use over water exports, and this can be done through vehicles
other than the Nebraska reciprocity clause.
do not share that judgment. If the Sporhase decision means that water
exports are inevitable, then Nebraska should take some steps to protect its
legitimate interests. This may include a policy of encouraging water exports
for the economic benefits of Nebraskans with water to sell. At this point,
however, it seems premature to conclude that the state's interest is best
served by aggressively trying to export Nebraska water for sale, the original
intent ofLB 146 and LB 151.

Water Right Transfers Policy Alternatives
The specter of selling water rights raises many of the same fears as selling
or exporting water. Images come to mind of irrigated land reverting to
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dryland, rural communities dying, and the state turning to dust. Again, these
fears are significantly exaggerated. As irrigation consumes approximately
ninety percent of all water used in the West (and in Nebraska), all nOnirriga_
tion uses could be doubled by reducing irrigation only ten percent. Even if
municipal and industrial water uses expand dramatically, they are not likely
to double for many years. Thus, making water rights salable will not lead to
the end of irrigated agriculture in Nebraska.
The LB 146 water transfers study recommends making water rights freely
transferable between uses and across river basin and state lines, subject to a
showing of no injury to existing water rights holders. This would create an
opportunity for some imaginative water management opportunities in
Nebraska. For example, if the Two Forks project to impound additiOnal
Platte River water in Colorado would reduce streamflow into Nebraska,
harming wildlife species, the Two Forks sponsors could avoid that harm by
purchasing Nebra'ika surface water rights and converting those rights to
instream uses. Similarly, if the Wyoming Deer Creek project would reduce
water availability to downstream Nebraska irrigators, Deer Creek Sponsors
could purchase Nebraska water rights and either retire them or make them
available to Nebraska irrigators. Upstream development could still occur,
and Nebraska water uses would be compensated either with money or with
water. Wildlife proponents within Nebraska could also buy out existing
irrigators and convert their rights to instream uses. Making water rights
salable would add considerable fleXibility to Nebraska water management
options.
Against this background, additional policy alternatives include doing
nothing and making water rights transferable, but only for environmental
enhancement and water resource mitigation.
Do Nothing. A possible alternative is to do nothing - to leave existing
water rights transfer policies intact. This would deprive Nebraska of the
flexibility afforded by water right transfers, but would largely insulate the
state from exporting water rights. If water rights could not be sold for use
outside the river basin or for a different use, there would be virtually no
economic reason to purchase water rights from within or outside of
Nebraska.
Environmental Enhancement and Mitigation Transfers. An intermediate policy would be to allow water rights to be changed to different uses
only when the purpose was to improve minimum streamflows or to mitigate
the harm to irrigators of an upstream water project. That is, irrigation water
rights could not be sold for municipal or industrial uses but could be sold for
environmental enhancement or mitigation. Thus, surface water rights could
be purchased and the water left in the stream either to compensate for the
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stream depletion effects of an upstream water project, or simply to improve
wildlife habitat. This option would allow Nebraska to capture some of the
flexibility afforded by water rights transfers without completely opening up
the possibility of interstate water rights transfers for municipal or industrial
purposes.

Conclusion
Water transfer is a difficult, complicated, and controversial topic. Unfortunately, the Sporhase decision will not allow Nebraska policymakers the
lUXUry of avoiding the issues involved. Policymakers must understand the
interrelationship of water transfer and its various policy strands with other
water policy issues, such as groundwater depletion, instream flows, financing
water development, and the relationship between water development and
crop surpluses. The Water Management Board's water transfer study and
proposed bills provide significant issues for political consideration. This
chapter provides a broader perspective of how these issues relate to larger
water and natural resource policy concerns.
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Endnote
1. An acre-foot of water is enough water to cover an acre of land to a depth of one foot a
325,851 gal\ons. An acre-foot of water will irrigate approximately one half acre of com or ~i1~
supply the domestic needs of a family of four for approximately one year.
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